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ABSTRACT
In Hii Chii Kok v (1) Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien; (2) National Cancer Centre, the Singapore
Court of Appeal followed the approach of other Commonwealth jurisdictions by rejecting
the application of Bolam as the standard of disclosure in claims concerning informed consent
to medical treatment. Instead, the court employed a modiﬁed version of the standard of dis-
closure adopted in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board. While broadly welcomed,
Montgomery has been criticised for its lack of clarity on the application of some elements of its
disclosure standard. In particular, questions remain as to: what factors should be taken into ac-
count within the reasonable and particular patient limbs of the test of materiality; how will the
‘reasonableness’ of alternative treatments be determined; and what is the scope of the thera-
peutic exception. This case commentary explores how Hii’s analysis of the modiﬁed standard
offers insights into how those elements ofMontgomery could be interpreted in the future.
KEYWORDS: Informed consent, standard of disclosure, Montgomery standard
INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the Singapore Court of Appeal followed the approach of other Commonwealth
jurisdictions by rejecting the application of Bolam1 to claims concerning informed con-
sent. In Hii Chii Kok v (1) Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien; (2) National Cancer Centre
(‘Hii’),2 the Singapore court said that the Bolam standard was doctor-centred as it fo-
cused upon whether a responsible body of medical opinion would have given the advice
VC The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creati-
vecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
* I would like to thank Dr Oliver Quick (Reader in Law, University of Bristol School of Law) and Professor
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1 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.
2 Hii Chii Kok v (1) Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien; (2) National Cancer Centre of Singapore Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 38.
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in question.3 The need to obtain a patient’s informed consent to medical treatment,
however, arose from the central principle that the patient had autonomy to decide such
matters. In recognition of this, the Court concluded it was necessary to move towards a
more patient-centric standard of disclosure.4 A similar conclusion had previously been
reached in the UK in the landmark case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board
(‘Montgomery’), which determined that the adequacy of disclosure was to be judged
from the perspective of the patient, rather than from the perspective of clinicians.5
Whilst the court in Hii recognised the need to move towards a patient-centric standard
of disclosure, they saw the medical profession as still having a role to play in assessing what
information should be given to patients.6 The Singapore Court of Appeal thus adopted a
modiﬁed version of the Montgomery test, utilising a three-stage approach, that is discussed
below. While the decision inMontgomery was largely welcomed by academic scholars,7 the
judgment has been criticised for its lack of clarity on some elements of the standard.
Although the form of the standard of disclosure in Hii is distinct from the Montgomery
standard, its substance is broadly the same. As such, the analysis of the different stages in
Hii can be used to shed light upon how aspects of theMontgomery standard could be inter-
preted. The Singapore decision is not binding on UK courts, but given that the develop-
ment of the Montgomery standard was inﬂuenced by judgments in Australia, Canada, and
the USA,Hii could be used to inﬂuence future interpretations ofMontgomery.
I begin with a summary of the Hii case and the different standards of disclosure set
out in Montgomery and Hii. Utilising the analysis of the Singapore Court of Appeal,
I then explore the different stages of the Hii standard, highlighting how this analysis
can be used to interpret elements of the Montgomery standard. In particular, I focus
upon: the distinction between a reasonable person in the patient’s circumstances and
the particular patient; deﬁning reasonable alternative treatments; the role Bolam may
continue to play; the scope of the therapeutic privilege exception; and how information
should be communicated. My analysis illustrates that whilst Hii aids the interpretation
of some of these issues, the role Bolam may play in future cases remains unclear, de-
spite the Supreme Court’s unequivocal rejection of it in Montgomery. There also
remains a lack of guidance for doctors on how information should be communicated.
HII: MODIFYING MONTGOMERY
Background
In 2010, following the identiﬁcation of a neuroendocrine tumour (NETs) in his right
lung, Mr Hii underwent a Gallium scan8 for the purposes of assessing other nodules
3 Bolam (n 1) 587.
4 Hii (n 2) [4].
5 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11.
6 Hii (n 2) [4].
7 Clark Hobson, ‘No (,) More Bolam Please: Montgomery v Lanarkshire Heath Board’ (2016) 79(3) MLR 488;
Anne Maree Farrell and Margaret Brazier, ‘Not so New Directions in the Law of Consent? Examining
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board’ (2016) 42 JME 85; Rob Heywood and Jose Miola, ‘The Changing Face
of Pre-Operative Medical Disclosure: Placing the Patient at the Heart of the Matter’ (2017) 133 LQR 296.
8 A Gallium scan uses radioactive material to look for inﬂammation, infection or cancer in the body:
<https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/003450.htm> accessed on 28 October 2018. In Mr Hii’s case it
was used in combination with CT scanning: Hii (n 2) [8].
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present in his lung. The Gallium scan, however, also identiﬁed the existence of two
nodules in his pancreas; one in the body of the pancreas and one in the pancreas
head. His treating clinicians believed those nodules may be pancreatic NETs
(PNETs) and an MRI scan was performed to investigate this further. The MRI scan
revealed no pancreatic masses, suggesting the pancreatic lesions seen on the earlier
scan were not malignant. However, in light of the conﬂicting ﬁndings, his clinicians
could not be certain as to the true nature of the pancreatic nodules.
Mr Hii was advised of the scan results and the uncertainty of the diagnosis.
However, in light of the possibility that the pancreatic nodules could be cancerous,
the ﬁrst defendant, Dr Ooi, advised Mr Hii to undergo surgery to remove the nodules.
Unfortunately, the position of one of the nodules in the pancreas head meant that Mr
Hii would have to undergo a Whipple procedure. This procedure involved removing
the head of the pancreas, together with parts of the bile duct, gallbladder, duodenum,
and stomach. Following this, the remaining parts of the pancreas, bile duct and stom-
ach would be surgically joined to preserve the integrity of the gastrointestinal tract
(an ‘anastomosis’). Mr Hii was advised that the surgery was complex and carried a
risk of post-operative anastomotic breakdown.
Given the seriousness and complexity of the proposed surgery, Mr Hii explored
the possibility of further investigations to determine the nature of the pancreatic nod-
ules. Those discussions took place separately with each defendant. During those dis-
cussions, Mr Hii was advised of four investigation/treatment options:
1. wait 6 months and then undergo further scanning. There was a risk that if the
lesions were cancerous, the malignancy would spread during this time.
2. Undergo further investigations by way of ultrasound examination and biopsy of
the masses. There was a risk these investigations would be inconclusive as a neg-
ative ﬁnding would not conﬁrm the lesions were non-cancerous.
3. Undergo surgical removal of the lesion in the body of the pancreas and biopsy
the lesion in the head of the pancreas. This would avoid the need for the
Whipple procedure but, subject to the ﬁndings of the biopsy, further surgery at
the head of the pancreas may have been required at a later date.
4. Undergo surgical removal of both lesions by way of the Whipple procedure.
Dr Ooi advised Mr Hii to undergo the Whipple procedure in light of the uncer-
tainty of diagnosis; the risk that further investigations would not resolve that uncer-
tainty; and that delay could result in cancerous spread. Dr Ooi also reassured Mr Hii
that, although there was a risk of anastomotic breakdown, given Mr Hii’s age and Dr
Ooi’s experience he was a good candidate for the procedure. Mr Hii eventually ac-
cepted this advice and underwent the surgery in August 2010.
Post-operatively, it was conﬁrmed the pancreatic nodules were not cancerous.
Unfortunately, in the post-operative period, Mr Hii’s anastomosis broke down leading
to the need for more surgery during which further parts of his pancreas were removed,
together with his spleen.
Mr Hii subsequently brought claims against Dr Ooi and the NCC alleging negli-
gence in their diagnosis, advice and treatment. His claims were dismissed by the
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Singapore High Court and that decision was upheld on appeal.9 This commentary fo-
cuses on the aspects of the Court of Appeal’s judgment dealing with the alleged negli-
gent advice.
In summary, Mr Hii argued that:
1. Montgomery reﬂected the correct standard of care for claims of negligent medical
advice.
2. ApplyingMontgomery, the advice of both defendants was deﬁcient because:
a. they failed to advise him of the limitations of the Gallium scan and the impor-
tance of the absence of positive results on other scans;
b. they should have advised him to undergo an ultrasound examination and bi-
opsy before proceeding to surgery by way of the Whipple procedure;
c. he was misinformed when he was told negative results from other scans could
not rule out PNETs and were, therefore, not of diagnostic value;
d. they should have advised him to undergo surgery to remove the pancreas
body nodule while conducting further tests on the nodule in the pancreas
head.
3. Had he been properly advised, he would not have undergone the Whipple
procedure.10
Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal concluded he had been given proper
advice on the uncertainty of the diagnosis and the available diagnostic/treatment
options. Having made that ﬁnding, the Singapore Court of Appeal declined to con-
sider the issue of causation.11 In giving its ruling, the Court of Appeal did take the op-
portunity to clarify the legal standard of disclosure in cases of alleged negligent
medical advice.
Applicable Law pre-Hii
Prior to the decision in Hii, in Gunapathy the Singapore Court of Appeal had accepted
that the Bolam test applied to disclosure of risks in the medical context.12 That test de-
rived from the English case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee where
MacNair J held that a doctor would not be negligent if he or she had acted ‘in accor-
dance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in
that particular art’.13 The later English case of Bolitho held that a body of opinion
would not be responsible if it was ‘not capable of withstanding logical analysis’.14
In Montgomery, however, the UK Supreme Court had conﬁrmed that Bolam was no
longer the applicable standard of disclosure in medical treatment.15 Mr Hii argued
that Montgomery also reﬂected the correct approach in Singapore.
9 Hii (n 2) [1].
10 ibid [47].
11 ibid [201]–[203].
12 Dr Khoo James and another v Gunapathy d/o Muniandy and another [2002] SGCA 25.
13 Bolam (n 1) 587 per McNair J.
14 Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, 243 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
15 Montgomery (n 5) [86].
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The Montgomery Standard
In Montgomery, having rejected Bolam as the applicable standard for determining the
question of negligent disclosure in medical treatment, the UK Supreme Court set out
the correct standard of disclosure. The court held that doctors had a duty to disclose
the material risks and anticipated beneﬁts of recommended treatment, together with
any reasonable alternative or variant treatments, and the risks and beneﬁts of such
alternatives.16 A risk would be ‘material’ if:
‘in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s
position would be likely to attach signiﬁcance to the risk, or the doctor is or should
reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach signiﬁcance
to it.’17
However, doctors would be justiﬁed in withholding information about material risks
from a patient if: (a) the doctor reasonably considered that disclosure would be seri-
ously detrimental to the patient’s health (‘the therapeutic exception’);18 (b) the cir-
cumstances made non-disclosure necessary, for example, where treatment was
required urgently but the patient was unconscious or otherwise unable to make a deci-
sion;19 or (c) the patient did not wish to be informed of risks.20
Montgomery Modiﬁed
The Singapore High Court held that they were bound by Gunapathy, but further
found that Mr Hii’s claim based on negligent disclosure and advice failed whether
Bolam or Montgomery was applied.21 Although that decision was upheld by the Court
of Appeal, the court took the opportunity to clarify the position as to what the stan-
dard of care was in the context of medical advice.
The court held that diagnosis, advice and treatment were different aspects of a doc-
tor’s duty of care to the patient, and thus the application of different tests to deter-
mine the standard of care for each aspect was justiﬁed. Bolam should continue to
apply to diagnosis and treatment but this was a doctor-centred test. Given the recog-
nition that patients have autonomy to decide whether to undergo medical treatment
or not, the question of whether a patient had received sufﬁcient information to enable
them to participate meaningfully in that decision had to be viewed from the patient’s
perspective. However, doctors’ views remained relevant to the question of what treat-
ments were available, the risks and beneﬁts of those, and the impact they may have
upon the patient. The standard of disclosure should seek to strike an appropriate bal-
ance between the perspectives of the patient and the doctor and to this end, the
16 ibid [87], [90].
17 ibid [87] per Lords Kerr and Reed. In formulating this test, the Supreme Court explicitly adopted the ap-
proach to materiality developed by the Australian High Court in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479
[16].
18 Montgomery (n 5) [88], [91].
19 ibid [88].
20 ibid [85].
21 Hii (n 2) [1].
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Court of Appeal adopted a modiﬁed version of the Montgomery standard aimed at
striking that balance.22
The modiﬁed approach involved a three-stage process in assessing whether the
standard of disclosure had been met, with each stage viewed from the perspective of
the court as the ultimate arbiter of such disputes.
1. The patient had to:
a. Identify the exact nature of the information it was alleged had not been
provided;
b. Establish why that information was relevant and material.
2. If (1) was met, the court had to determine whether the doctor was in possession
of the information in question.
3. If the doctor did possess the information, the court would then examine the doc-
tor’s reasons for withholding that information in order to determine whether
the non-disclosure was justiﬁed.23
BREAKING DOWN THE HII STANDARD
The Hii standard is framed differently to the Montgomery standard as the Hii standard
focuses on the approach the court must take when determining whether non-
disclosure in the context of medical treatment amounts to negligence. In contrast, the
Montgomery standard is framed from the perspective of what the doctor must do.
Despite these differences in form, the two standards are similar in substance. The
Court of Appeal’s judgment in Hii analysed its three-stage approach with a view to
giving practical guidance on its application. This analysis highlights the similarities be-
tween the two standards and sheds light on how elements of theMontgomery standard
could be interpreted.
Stage One: Relevant and Material Information
Stage one of the Hii standard requires disclosure of:
‘(a) information that would be relevant and material to a reasonable patient situated
in the particular patient’s position, or (b) information that a doctor know is impor-
tant to the particular patient in question.’24
This echoes the Montgomery test for determining which risks should be disclosed. In
Montgomery it was said doctors must disclose material risks and a risk would be mate-
rial if: (a) a reasonable person in the patient’s circumstances would have attached sig-
niﬁcance to it; or (b) where the doctor knew, or ought reasonably to have known,
that the particular patient would attach signiﬁcance to it.
Heywood and Miola have highlighted Montgomery’s failure to clarify what factors
fall to be considered under the reasonable patient limb given the references to some-
one ‘in the patient’s position’, and what factors would fall within the particular patient
22 ibid [4].
23 ibid [132]–[134].
24 ibid [132].
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limb.25 Miola had previously highlighted this uncertainty in the context of the
Australian case of Rogers v Whittaker,26 which formed the basis of the revised standard
of disclosure in Montgomery. Miola noted that Rogers appeared to interpret ‘the
patient’s position’ narrowly, limiting it to the patient’s physical characteristics.27 Thus,
Heywood and Miola suggested that the patient’s physical characteristics would fall
within the reasonable patient limb, whereas the patient’s personal characteristics (such
as the patient’s views, eccentricities, and religious beliefs) would fall within the partic-
ular patient limb.28 The court in Hii appeared to have this criticism in mind29 as its
judgment sought to clarify what information about the patient should be taken into
account under each limb. However, the court adopted a different position to
Heywood and Miola.
According to the Hii judgment, the patient’s personal circumstances would be rele-
vant under the ‘reasonable patient’ limb. Thus, if a procedure carried a slight risk of
scarring and the patient was an aspiring model, that risk should be disclosed on the
basis that a reasonable patient who aspired to be a model would attach signiﬁcance to
that risk.30 In contrast, the particular patient limb would only trigger a duty of disclo-
sure where the patient had asked particular questions, or expressed particular
concerns.31
While the Hii judgment provides the desired clarity, the likelihood of this interpre-
tation of the two limbs being extended to the Montgomery standard is uncertain. In
particular, the Supreme Court in Montgomery rejected the notion that a patient had to
ask speciﬁc questions to trigger disclosure beyond that which all patients would be en-
titled to. The court said that to hold otherwise would be:
‘[. . .] a reversal of logic: the more a patient knows about the risks she faces, the easier
it is for her to ask speciﬁc questions about those risks [. . .] but it is those who lack
such knowledge [. . .] who are in the greatest need of information.’32
In addition, they said that such a requirement ignored ‘the social and psychological real-
ities’33 of the doctor–patient relationship where ‘few patients do not feel intimidated or
inhibited to some degree’.34
At ﬁrst sight, this seems to suggest that the particular patient limb of Montgomery
could not be interpreted as it was in Hii because to do so would require patients to
ask questions to trigger disclosure. However, I argue that the Hii interpretation ena-
bles the test of materiality to address the disclosure needs of both the questioning and
the unquestioning patient, while clarifying where particular factors about a patient fall
25 Heywood and Miola (n 7) 296, 304.
26 Rogers (n 17).
27 Jose´ Miola, ‘On the Materiality of Risk: Paper Tigers and Panaceas’ (2009) 17 Med Law Rev 76, 92.
28 Heywood and Miola (n 7) 304.
29 Miola (n 27) was cited inHii (n 2).
30 Hii (n 2) [144]. The example the court gave was taken from: Rob Heywood, ‘Subjectivity in Risk
Disclosure: Considering the Position of the Particular Patient’ (2009) 25(1) Professional Negligence 3, 7.
31 Hii (n 2) [145].
32 Montgomery (n 5) [58].
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
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to be considered. This is because, under the Hii interpretation, the need to disclose in-
formation to a patient who asks no questions and expresses no concerns is still trig-
gered by reference to the patient’s perspective, rather than the doctor’s perspective. It
takes account of the patient’s particular circumstances, which incorporates matters be-
yond the patient’s physical characteristics, such as the nature of the patient’s employ-
ment, religious beliefs etc. For patients, however, who do ask questions or express
concerns, the particular patient limb then ensures that a duty of disclosure is triggered
in response to those questions or concerns. Support for this interpretation can be
found within Heywood and Miola’s paper where, in the context of the particular pa-
tient limb, they comment that ‘it is difﬁcult to see how else a doctor might be found liable
for something they were not told.’35
Stage One: Reasonable Alternative or Variant Treatments
Like Montgomery, Hii recognises that patients need to be advised of any reasonable al-
ternative or variant treatments that are available, and their associated and comparative
risks and beneﬁts in order to weigh up how to proceed.36 Heywood and Miola have
criticised Montgomery for failing to clarify how ‘reasonableness’ is to be assessed in
this context. They note that two cases prior to Montgomery did consider the question
of alternative procedures and treatments.37 Based on those earlier cases, Heywood
and Miola said we could deduce the following principles: (1) there is an obligation to
discuss alternative procedures where there is a less risky alternative that would be rec-
ommended by another healthcare professional; (2) there is no obligation to discuss al-
ternative diagnoses. However, they said that the failure to consider those cases in
Montgomery meant that there was a lack of guidance as to when an alternative or vari-
ant treatment would require disclosure.38
Laing suggested the uncertainty around what amounts to a reasonable alternative
treatment was likely to be particularly problematic for practitioners issuing pharmaco-
logical prescriptions. In those circumstances, there may be a wide range of alternative
medications available, all of which would have different risks, beneﬁts and interactions.
However, information about these may not be easily accessible.39
The court in Hii did give some guidance as to the potential scope of ‘reasonable al-
ternative treatment’. The judgment stated that clinicians are not obliged to discuss
‘fringe’ treatments, alternative medicine, or ‘mainstream treatment options which are ob-
viously inappropriate on the facts’.40 However, this phrasing seems to point towards the
35 Heywood and Miola (n 7) 305.
36 Hii (n 2) [142].
37 Birch v University College London NHS Foundation Trust [2008] EWHC 2237 (QB); (2008) 104 BMLR
168: The patient suffered a stroke after a cerebral catheter angiogram was performed. She had not been ad-
vised that she could undergo an MRI scan instead which was less precise but carried no risk of stroke. Her
claim was successful; Meiklejohn v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2014] EWCA Civ 120; [2014] Med
LR 122: The patient developed avascular necrosis, a recognised complication of medication he had been
prescribed. He argued that he should have been advised of the alternative diagnoses and, therefore, alterna-
tive treatments. His claim was unsuccessful.
38 Heywood and Miola (n 7) 307–09.
39 Judy Laing, ‘Delivering Informed Consent Post-Montgomery: Implications for Medical Practice and
Professionalism’ (2017) 33(2) PN 128, 143.
40 Hii (n 2) [142].
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application of a Bolam standard. How will the courts know whether a treatment was
fringe, alternative, or mainstream but inappropriate without recourse to expert medi-
cal evidence? While the court in Hii did not seek to exclude the doctor’s perspective
from information disclosure, they were clear (as was the court in Montgomery) that
Bolam should not play a role.41
Thus, while Hii could ﬁll the gap in guidance left by Montgomery as to what consti-
tutes a ‘reasonable’ alternative, it seems it can only do so by reintroducing Bolam.
Thus, despite Montgomery’s rejection of Bolam as the applicable standard for informa-
tion disclosure in medical treatment, qualifying the standard by reference to ‘reason-
ableness’ makes it inevitable that Bolam will continue to play a role. Medical expert
evidence will be necessary to determine what other treatments existed and the extent
to which they were reasonable alternatives. Where there are differences of opinion on
these between healthcare professionals, given that these involve questions of appropri-
ate medical treatment, it is likely the courts will fall back on the Bolam approach. If
this is to be done, it is important for the courts to be clear and explicit as to when reli-
ance on Bolam will be justiﬁed and the boundaries of its use in order to ensure Bolam
does not creep back in as the standard for information disclosure.42
Stage Two: Possessing Information
If the patient is able to establish that the information in question was relevant and ma-
terial, the court should then consider whether that information was in the doctor’s
possession. This step is not explicitly addressed within the Montgomery standard but it
is implicit in it. As was said in Hii, if the doctor did not have the information then it
made ‘little sense to ask whether [the doctor] should have given it to the patient; one can-
not give what one does not have’.43
Not being in possession of the information does not mean the doctor escapes lia-
bility. Instead, in Hii it was said that the court would have to consider whether the
doctor ought to have been in possession of the information but that question was to
be assessed under the rubric of negligent diagnosis or treatment where the appropri-
ateness of the doctor’s conduct would be judged according to the Bolam standard.44
This was because, according to the court in Hii, ‘the crux of such a complaint will be
that the doctor made the wrong diagnosis or failed to administer the proper treatment due
to his ignorance or carelessness’.45 However, it is submitted that this reasoning is ﬂawed.
If the court ﬁnds that a relevant and material risk was not disclosed to a patient but
the doctor’s reason for non-disclosure was lack of knowledge of the risk, then accord-
ing to Hii this should be treated as a matter of negligent diagnosis or treatment. The
presence of the risk, however, does not affect the diagnosis. In those circumstances
then, it seems the court is saying that the treatment is negligent because the doctor
41 ibid [126];Montgomery (n 5) [85]–[86], [115].
42 Other ‘non-Bolam’ informed consent cases have recognised that medical professional opinion will continue
to be relevant but that it should not be determinative: Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 F 2d 772 [27]; Reibl
v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880, 895. This view was also expressed in an Australian case pre-dating Rogers (n
17): F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, 194, 205.
43 Hii (n 2) [133].
44 ibid [133], [147].
45 ibid [133].
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did not make himself aware of the risk. This, however, only impacts treatment if the
patient would have elected another form of treatment, or no treatment, if warned of
the risk. The ﬁrst question to determine will be whether the doctor should have
known of the risk; and that will be judged by the Bolam standard. Assuming the doc-
tor should have known of the risk, the court will then have to explore whether the
patient would have proceeded with the treatment if the risk had been disclosed.
However, that is a question of what effect the doctor’s failure to apprise himself of the
risk had on the patient’s decision to proceed; it does not render the treatment, nor
the doctor’s recommendation of that treatment, negligent. It is still a question of
negligent advice and it seems the court’s desire to recategorise it as negligent diagnosis
or treatment stems from a desire to keep the Bolam standard away from questions of
disclosure. As with reasonable alternative treatments however, it highlights the risk of
the reintroduction of Bolam to determine questions of reasonableness.
Stage Three: The Therapeutic Privilege Exception
Hii recognised that there would be some circumstances where non-disclosure of mate-
rial information would be justiﬁed. Those circumstances were not limited and would
depend upon the court’s assessment of the doctor’s reasons for non-disclosure.
Examples included: the patient choosing not to be informed; emergencies where
treatment was necessary to avoid the patient’s death or serious harm, yet the patient
lacked temporary decision-making capacity, which are practical issues; or, more con-
troversially, the therapeutic privilege, whereby the doctor believed giving the patient
particular information would cause the patient serious physical or mental harm.46
Montgomery also recognised these as scenarios which could justify non-disclosure, al-
though the Supreme Court referred to them as ‘exceptions’ to the requirement of dis-
closure, rather than as justiﬁcations for non-disclosure.47
In the wake of Montgomery, Heywood and Miola and Cave have noted the failure
of the Supreme Court to clarify the scope of the therapeutic privilege.48 For example,
what amounts to ‘serious harm’ or ‘detriment’ to the patient’s health is not deﬁned.49
There is little guidance to be derived from case law as ‘few cases refer to the therapeutic
privilege, even fewer apply it and none have accepted it as a defence’.50
Hii does seek to deﬁne the scope of the therapeutic privilege with the judgment
stating that the privilege covers those who ‘have mental capacity [but whose] decision-
making abilities are impaired to an appreciable degree’.51 This includes: those with anxi-
ety disorders; geriatric patients who are ‘easily frightened out of having even relatively
safe treatments that can drastically improve their quality of life’;52 or those whose intel-
lectual abilities or education make it extremely difﬁcult to ‘explain the true reality’ to
46 ibid [148]–[152].
47 Montgomery (n 5) [85], [88]. Such exceptions have also been recognised in other ‘non-Bolam’ informed
consent cases: Canterbury (n 42) [37]; Reibl (n 42) 827; Rogers (n 17) [14], [16].
48 Heywood and Miola (n 7) 311; Emma Cave, ‘The Ill-informed: Consent to Medical Treatment and the
Therapeutic Exception’ (2017) CLWR 46(2) 140, 142.
49 Heywood and Miola (n 7) 311.
50 Cave (n 48) 143.
51 Hii (n 2) [152].
52 ibid [152].
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them.53 This seems to move towards a territory whereby capacity as a condition of au-
tonomous decision-making falls by the wayside as the therapeutic privilege is used to
justify non-disclosure in cases where people have capacity but may refuse treatment if
given relevant and material information. However, as the Supreme Court did in
Montgomery,54 the Court of Appeal in Hii said it is not to be used to enable doctors to
prevent patients from making choices about medical treatment where they are capable
of doing so, simply because the doctor considers treatment to be in their best inter-
ests.55 What is unclear is where the line is drawn in scenarios of ‘borderline’ capacity
where a patient’s decision-making is impaired, yet not to the extent that the patient is
deemed incapable of making a decision.
In Hii the court said that in determining whether the therapeutic privilege applies,
medical expert evidence would be relevant although the Bolam standard would not be
applied. The question for the court is not whether a body of doctors supported non-
disclosure but whether:
‘the patient was suffering from such an afﬂiction that he in fact was likely to be
harmed by being apprised of the relevant information. Or that the patient, though
not strictly lacking mental capacity, nonetheless suffered from such an impairment of
his decision-making abilities that the doctor would be entitled to withhold the infor-
mation [. . .].’56
Despite this clariﬁcation in Hii, given the absence of cases utilising the therapeutic
privilege as a defence, the need for its existence remains open to question.57 It is nota-
ble that, despite Montgomery’s approval of the therapeutic privilege, in the General
Medical Council’s proposed revised consent guidance, the therapeutic privilege is ab-
sent, suggesting that that this is no longer seen as a necessary exception in medical
practice.58
How to Communicate
At ﬁrst sight, Hii appears to take a different stance to Montgomery in respect of the
doctor’s role in securing patient understanding. While Montgomery said that the doc-
tor’s advisory role involved dialogue aimed at ensuring that patients understood the in-
formation they were given,59 in Hii it was said that the doctor’s obligation was not to
ensure understanding. Instead, it was limited to the doctor taking reasonable steps to
enable the patient to understand the information.60 Thus, Montgomery seems to
place doctors under a more onerous obligation in respect of ensuring patient
53 ibid [152].
54 Montgomery (n 5) [91].
55 Hii (n 2) [153].
56 ibid [153].
57 Cave (n 48) 155–156.
58 General Medical Council, ‘Decision making and consent. Supporting patient choices about health and care.
Draft guidance for consultation’ (2018) <https://www.gmc-uk.org/-/media/ethical-guidance/related-pdf-
items/consent-daft-guidance/consent-draft-guidance.pdf?
la¼en&hash¼B117C71B5F6082312DD4C4A78EE6B39B9B43A8FB> accessed on 1 November 2018.
59 Montgomery (n 5) [90].
60 Hii (n 2) [154].
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understanding. However, given that a doctor’s duty in negligence is to take reasonable
care, it seems likely that doctors will only need to take reasonable steps to ensure un-
derstanding, bringing theMontgomery standard closer to the Hii interpretation.61
Heywood and Miola note Montgomery’s direction to ensure understanding through
dialogue, but are critical of its failure to set out what practical steps must be taken and
how far doctors are expected to go to ensure understanding.62 Hii does explore the
nature of communication that should take place, stating that provision of information
alone is not enough and it must be ‘accompanied by a quality of communication that is
commensurate with the ability of the patient to understand the information’.63 Thus, the
information must be presented ‘in terms and at a pace’64 that allows the patient to as-
similate it in order to make an informed decision. This suggests that just as the doctor
has to take account of the individual patient’s circumstances when deciding what to
disclose, the doctor must also take account of the patient’s needs when deciding how
to inform the patient. There remains, however, a lack of clarity about how this should
be done in an individual case. For example, would it be sufﬁcient to discuss the risks
of an operation with a patient and then provide an information leaﬂet setting out
those risks for the patient to take away, with the patient being given the option to con-
tact the doctor for further information if there is anything the patient doesn’t under-
stand? Or should there be a second consultation as a matter of routine to check
understanding? If so, how should those checks take place? These are questions that
remain unanswered by either Montgomery or Hii yet will be important for doctors to
know in clinical practice.
CONCLUSION
Hii is the latest in a line of Commonwealth cases to reject the application of the
Bolam standard to cases of informed consent to medical treatment in favour of a
patient-centric standard. In doing so, it echoed the approaches of other
Commonwealth jurisdictions (namely Australia, the USA and Canada) by recognising
that while the adequacy of disclosure should be judged from the patient’s perspective,
the medical profession’s views would still be relevant (although not determinative).
This stands in contrast to Montgomery which stated there was no longer any role for
Bolam in such cases and, by implication, the views of the medical profession. This led
the Singapore court in Hii to adopt a modiﬁed version of the Montgomery test in
which it sought to balance medical and patient perspectives in questions of informed
consent. Despite this, there are substantive similarities between the Hii and
Montgomery standards which enable us to draw upon the analysis in Hii in order to
shed light on questions raised by the revised standard in Montgomery. Hii offers some
approaches to interpretation which could be used to develop the application of the
Montgomery standard in the UK, but gaps remain.
61 This would be consistent with ruling in Al Hamwi v Johnston [2005] EWHC 2006 (QB); [2005] All ER
(D) 278 (Feb), yet Al Hamwi said doctors were not under a duty to ensure understanding which runs con-
trary to the dicta inMontgomery (n 5). Al Hamwi was not cited or considered inMontgomery.
62 Heywood and Miola (n 7) 311.
63 Hii (n 2) [155].
64 ibid [156].
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The analysis in Hii (and that in other Commonwealth jurisdictions) suggests that
the views of the medical profession will continue to play a role in determining
whether an alternative treatment amounted to a reasonable alternative and whether a
doctor should have been in possession of particular information. Where there is dis-
agreement within the medical profession about these questions, it seems inevitable
that Bolam will creep back in as a way of resolving such disputes, even if it is not deter-
minative of the ultimate question of the adequacy of disclosure. It is important that
the UK courts recognise this when applying Montgomery and explicitly set out when
and to what extent medical professional views have inﬂuenced decisions. The use of
such views should be limited to questions which can only be resolved with medical
opinion and should not be allowed to inﬂuence the court’s view as to what informa-
tion the patient would have been likely to have found signiﬁcant.
There is a persisting lack of clarity as to how the therapeutic privilege or exception
should be applied and its role in cases of borderline capacity, given that it should not
be used to override a patient’s choice which may run counter to the clinician’s view as
to what is best for the patient. This lack of clarity and the absence of cases however
suggest this may be a theoretical problem rather than a practical one. Given the
GMC’s decision to remove reference to it in their consent guidance, it may be time
for the UK courts to consider at the next opportunity whether such an exception is
needed at all and, if so, what its scope should be.
Finally, there remain unanswered questions as to what practical steps doctors are
expected to take when communicating information to patients to enable and ensure
that patients understand that information. The qualiﬁcation of ‘reasonableness’ sheds
little light on this. It seems unlikely it will be enough to do as other doctors would do
as Hii suggests the need to tailor communication to the individual; an approach that
accords with Montgomery’s focus on the individual patient. Further clariﬁcation on this
could be developed in conjunction with doctors, patients and medical professional
bodies, such as the GMC.
Hii then offers some welcome insights into Montgomery’s unanswered questions
but further clarity is needed in particular areas. Reviewing and monitoring approaches
of the UK courts and those of other Commonwealth jurisdictions could provide that
clarity.
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